By the death of Ivan III, Russia’s drive toward unity seemed to be complete: the Tsars had created a strong, unified, wealthy and self-confident state out of the chaos of local particularism, a particularism based on nothing else but the will to power of the rulers. Russia was now the defender of true Christendom.

There were three independent principalities in existence after the death of Ivan: Riazan, Severskii and Pskov. While it seems that these problems had been dealt with before, it must be kept in mind that there was as yet no real bureaucracy in Moscow, and victories often went without proper follow up. It was not difficult for leading citizens to rebuild some sort of independence after being defeated by previous rulers, in that there was no structure for domination. Russia at this time, true was religiously unified, linguistically and largely culturally, but rulership was strictly personal, with all the limitations that implies.

Basil was then to complete the work of the great Muscovite Grand Princes by creating that structure of domination. Without a regular ruling structure, the conquests of Ivan could have no lasting value. Dealing with the above mentioned cities was easy, keeping them under Moscow was another matter. While Pskov merchants threatened war with Moscow, Basil sought to limit the bloodshed by merely arresting their highest ranking dignitaries, and providing them with an ultimatum: accept direct rule from Muscovite lieutenants, reject the oligarchy of the assembly, and never ally with Poland. Their elite were scattered, as the Novgorodians were under Ivan. The prince of Riazan was arrested, and Novgorod-Sverskii was absorbed after the bloody Russo-Lithuanian war of 1507-8. Muscovite successes in the east threatened all players in this region. Lithuania had been exhausted in the nearly constant territorial wars with Moscow, and was largely dependent on Poland for assistance.

Lithuania was divided at this time, with pro-Moscow and pro-Polish factions vying for power. Firmly Roman Catholic, the Polish/Lithuanian Commonwealth was engaged in powerful anti-Russian propaganda in Europe, which might be responsible for the “Asiatic savage” image much of Europe maintained at the time, and even into the present day. The Khan of the Crimea, threatened by Russian advances, threw in his lot with the Poles, while Basil went to the Khan of Astrakhan for assistance. By 1520, the Dnieper river had become the border between the two empires, and, significantly, the border between Orthodoxy and Catholicism in eastern Europe.

The two major Russo-Lithuanian confrontations made certain that, first, Lithuania was becoming a more minor player in European politics, that, second, Poland was the dominant Catholic power in the east, and third, that the old appanages were now administratively, not just theoretically, part of Russia/Muscovy. Lastly, relations between Crimea and Moscow were tidied up, largely due to a substantial cash payment, and the realization that Moscow was largely invincible over the long term.

Unsurprisingly, the domestic agenda of Basil differed little from that of Ivan. As is common in the literature on this period, there was a distinct means whereby the old nobility were being replaced with a new service nobility. Two types of landholding had developed by the reign of Ivan and Basil, firstly that of hereditary right, largely reserved for those related to the Ruirikid line of princes. It was this line that Basil sought to eliminate from political power. He did this by granting land to servitors on condition of service, hence the “service nobility.” These two groups of elite were very different in background and outlook. The old boyar class believed they had a right to rule the principalities granted to them by tradition, a right that is surely born out by history. The service nobility was the beginning of administration, of lower background and dedicated to the expansion of Muscovy and the unification of political rule. Unfortunately, while the old boyar idea is the truly traditional form of landholding, it was impractical given the realities of world politics by 1500. The expansion of Russia provided Ivan and Basil with the lands necessary to grant to this new nobility.

It is very difficult to see how Rus could have fought off its numerous enemies being divided up into dozens of small principalities, each led by a Ruirikid prince jealous of all the others. Like much else in Russian history, the relative centralization of Muscovite rule is dictated not by social theory, but by military necessity. The Orthodox church, now an independent entity after the fall by Byzantium in 1453, strongly desired the centralization of Moscow power, and, outside of military victory, ecclesiastical and monastic support was the major prop in Russian expansion and unification. This service nobility will form the backbone of the Russian state, the create for Basil the large retinue that will eventually become the beginnings of administration.

During the reign of Basil III, Moscow began to make substantial strides in the realm of scholarship and culture. For better or worse, the Italian Renaissance reached Moscow through the translation labors of the famed monk St. Maximos the Greek, who arrived in Moscow between 1515 and 1517, after receiving his education at the hands of the Italians. Maximos’ translations formed the basis of Russian ecclesiastical culture, and was the first to begin the struggle between Greek and Old Russian translations of church texts. Maximos became a critic of Basil and his foreign policy, as well as Russian monastic landholding. Basil viewed Maximos as brilliant, but as a Greek patriot who saw Russian expansion coming at the expense of the prestige of the now Turkish Byzantine empire. Maximos also made a point of criticizing the lack of formal bureaucracy in Moscow, largely by condemning the more informal system of “feeding,” where agents of Basil were paid, not by the royal treasury, but by the local peasants.

Maximos was a believer in a centralized monarchy, one with a professional bureaucracy, and with a monastic estate dedicated solely to ascetic labors, without property of any kind. Maximos was looked at as a subversive Greek nationalist, but whose impact on Russian cultural life is incalculable.

What does “The Third Rome” mean?

This is a very difficult question. As always, the academics and “Russia specialists” get it wrong. The normal System approach is sarcasm and mockery, believing the “The Third Rome” was some sort of propaganda trick. The reality is very complicated. “The Third Rome” makes reference to the place that Rome is not a city, but an idea. An idea of a Christendom that is worldwide, one with a global mission, one where all men can potentially be saved. Unlike Talmudic Judaism (based on race) or tribal paganism (based on social loyalty), Rome refers to universality. Since the first Rome fell to the heresy of papalism, the second fell to the Turks, Rome, as the defender of Orthodox Truth, moved to Moscow with the marriage of Ivan III to the niece of the last Byzantine emperor.

The “Third Rome” and “Holy Russia,” mean the same thing. It is “Jerusalem,” the defender of God’s law and his revelation. The monarch is the equivalent of David, while the patriarch is the equivalent of Samuel. In fact, Ivan IV used this imagery in his correspondence with Andrei Kurbskii, a scion of the major boyar military class. Ivan IV explicitly made parallels with the Old Testament to understand and explain his position.

Therefore, “The Third Rome” and “Holy Russia,” do not refer to a fact of life, so much as a responsibility, a process mirrored by David and Joshua of the Old Testament. Holy Russia was called upon to give its entire substance to defend the Orthodox faith.