For contemporary academics, intellectual dishonesty is a way of life. The maintenance of positive relations with the major grant producing organizations force academics to form their research agenda accordingly. As a result, academia, like journalism, has little relation to the purpose of their vocation, and certainly, in the case of academics, do not justify their large, and often taxpayer-financed salaries. In few areas is this more obvious than in Russia scholars dealings with the reign of Ivan IV, sometimes called “the terrible.”

The name “terrible” in an older form of English, means “awesome,” “extraordinary.” The Russian is groznii. The very fact that Anglo-American historians assume that “terrible” means “bad” might give us a hint at the level to which Russia studies has fallen. Ivan IV was called “terrible” by his contemporaries, as well as by later Russian princes because they considered him great. Ivan IV is a major hero in the folk songs of the Russian peasantry, though it’s a rare tenured professor who dares ask why.

Now, the reign of Ivan IV was a very long one. Russia was blessed with a string of competent rulers who reigned, comparatively speaking, for long periods of time. By and large, this is one of the necessary ingredients in building a successful and prosperous monarchy. Maintaining an “elected” executive, ruling for a short period of time in modern societies is merely another means to ensure a weak executive to maintain the rule of capital. Long reigns, on the other hand, ensure the strength of the public authority over the private, consistency in policy and a focus of loyalty. Ivan’s reign lasted for an amazing 51 years at one capacity or another.

Ivan’s significance is that he placed the unbreakable seal upon the victories over disunity of Ivan and Basil. If Ivan III created modern Russia, then Ivan became its most vigilant guardian. Without the long reign of Ivan, there is very good reason to believe that Russia would have gone the way of Poland: an aristocratic oligarchy, eventually doomed to disintegration against more unified neighbors.

At the death of Basil III, Ivan, his son, was a boy of three. The strength of the boyars, far from exhausted, realized the obvious: that if they were to regain their former power and divide up Russia amongst themselves (or battle for Moscow), the time to strike was now. The aristocracy, while under strong royal rule was the backbone of the state, without such strength and control it became merely the backbone of rapacity and amorality. They quickly moved against the boy heir. Basil had made certain that his second wife Helena guarded the boy with an eye to maintaining the autocracy, realizing full well the capabilities of the boyar class. She was evidently poisoned in 1538. The boyar clans took over the operation of the state for their own personal benefit. The state to these clans was merely a brothel that existed for their own pleasure (though they rarely paid). The treasures of the palaces were removed, taken by boyar elites; tax gathering existed solely for the personal needs of the clans; private armies were raised to extract unjust taxes from the communes. The church was reduced to a social institution of secondary importance. Boyar rule was a disaster.

The main boyar clan that tried to rule this chaos was the Shuskii clan, which will become even more famous during the Time of Troubles. Helena and the saintly Metropolitan Daniel were the defenders of the unified royal order of Moscow, the guardian of Orthodoxy and the successor of Rome/Constantinople. Technically, the boyar clans, while she lived, needed to answer to the two of them. Once Helena was poisoned, the church, typified by Daniel, was considered an enemy of boyardom.

Without understanding this background, understanding Ivan’s later policies makes little sense, which, in short, is why it is very rare that this background is dealt with in the official literature. For the establishment academic, aristocratic or merchant oligarchy is a precursor to democracy (defined in the typically ideological method by modernity), in that oligarchy “inevitably” gives way to “democracy.” While leaving the absurdity of this common claim for another time, this is the ideological basis for the Anglo-American literature on this important topic. As a result, this colors their historical treatment, for, starting from the a priori idea that oligarchy is a good thing, the policies of Ivan in destroying it must be “bad,” ipso facto. Again, this should give some indication of the nature of English-language Russian studies.

Ivan, always intelligent, always precocious, was forced to declare himself in his majority at age 13, certainly a curse no one would wish on their worst enemy. Contrary to the mainstream literature, there is absolutely no evidence of Ivan being “mentally unstable” or, laughably, “throwing cats and dogs off the roof of the kremlin,” which is pure fantasy, and tells more about historians than about Ivan.

Ivan was forced to mature far in advance of his age. But given his isolation during the stage of aristocratic oligarchy, Ivan, during his tender years, had little to do than read. As a result, Ivan became extremely knowledgeable in theology and literature, and developed a famous flair for writing and polemic. Ivan was not merely a monarch, but was a theorist of monarchy and its moral and social nature. Anyone alive at the time realized that Russia was at a potentially violent crossroads: she will go either the way of Poland or France, politically speaking. Either Russia will become a rapacious oligarchy just waiting to become democratic, or she will become a unified monarchy. Ivan stepped in when he did to make sure that Russia never became Poland.

Ivan’s accomplishments during his long reign are far too great for this paltry set of lectures. But I hope to touch on some of the most important, dealing with domestic affairs first.

Though you will never hear this in an academic political theory class, there are two forms of democracy. Full of guile, the establishment will use a single word that encompasses many meanings with the sole purpose of muddying the waters of “public debate,” an institution they do not believe in or accept. The first kind of democracy is one accepted and institutionalized in medieval Christian life: democracy as representation, where various institutions, growing and maturing over centuries, such as aristocratic assemblies, peasant communes, monarchies, monasteries and local parishes, all checking and organically developing in reference to one another in often imperceptible ways, truly represent all elements in social life. This amounts to true, local representation and popular participation. The second form of democracy is more accurately called “parliamentarianism,” and is normally what academics mean when thy use the term “democracy.” This form of rule is based solely on a class of politicians, and hence bureaucrats dependent upon them, who are elected to their position based solely on their social connections and financial state. Poor people do not run for election in modern democracies, because it costs millions of dollar to run even a minor campaign, and media recognition itself is based on one’s connections with the few families that run the world’s media. It is oligarchy in a rather naked form. And it is this form of rule that is dominant in modernity, and is often called, in Regime sources, “Freedom.”

Ivan sought to continue to build democracy in its proper representative form, which, in Russia, developed to an extraordinary degree. Society was envisaged by Ivan as comprising not mere numbers to be counted and manipulated, but as a series of interests, interests that have proven themselves necessary and useful for social life over centuries of practice. This is normal medieval political praxis. The aristocracy, if properly led, was the basis of local government, culture and manners. The peasants, organized in democratic communes and also an important part of local government, were those who fed the nation. The church was the literary and spiritual heart of the country, providing it with its courage, standards and ultimately, salvation. The monarchy, while often not dealing with local concerns at all, was primarily a military institution protecting the lower orders from outsiders and invaders.

As a result of this organic view of society, Ivan formed the boyar duma, or an official association, a form of legislature, to control the upper classes, as well as to take advantage of their proximity to local concerns. As with the Senate in Peter’s reign, this duma was to provide the monarchy with reports on local concerns and issues. No tsar could afford to ignore the recommendations of such a group, as they represented a powerful and wealthy part of society, with an important part to play in the body politic.

As far as the church is concerned, Ivan called the Sobor of the Hundred Chapters. As the Russian church was now the head of Christendom, it made sense that, as Ivan III had reorganized the law of the state and the nobility, Ivan IV was to do the same for the church. Ivan was convinced that only by increasing the standards of education and moral conduct of the clergy could Russia ever truly be considered the heir to Byzantium and the leader of the Christian world. From the Old Testament, Ivan realized that “church” and “state” (to use two very vague terms) were never to be separate, but their functions were very different. The tsar is the defender of the church and the final judge in socially significant moral matters. With rapacious Islam to the south and Roman Catholicism to the west, who had, incidentally, made a violent crusade against the Russian “schismatics” part of its day-to-day nomenclature, such a theory of church-state relations was far from mere academic hair-splitting. The sobor regularized the position of the clergy and called monastic property inviolable. Later, under both Peter and Catherine, this council will be revoked, to the horror of the Old Believers, primarily so as to justify the taking of monastic properties, a la Henry VIII, to serve state purposes.

In the realm of trading, Ivan was very interested in creating western contacts. German and Dutch oligarchies were very threatened by Russia’s size and natural resources, and sought to starve Russia by trading only through ports controlled by Protestants and Roman Catholics in Livonia and elsewhere in the Baltics. Though Ivan had built trading cities in the north, these were deliberately ignored by northern Europe. However, Russia was not ignored by the English (in regular competition with the Dutch), and trading relations were established with them as a way around the blockade.

Elsewhere, Ivan destroyed the old Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, and, incidentally destroyed their slave markets. As Orthodox Christendom was officially banning slavery, this practice was being given a new lease on life by Islam, and the Catholic cities of Ragusa and Venice were taking up the slack. The largest slave market in the world was based within the Astrakhan Khanate. Kazan was overthrown in 1552, though it should be noted that in both cases, very favorable terms were offered for their surrender, though, unfortunately for the Muslims, they were not taken, nor were there any attempts to convert the Muslims of the south by anything but peaceful means. In 1554, the Islamic tribes of the south sought protection with Ivan against their more fundamentalist neighbors, and Ivan, through voluntary submission, took the Caucasus. Many of the mountain tribes practiced a “folk” Islam (where, for example, they could drink), and had little use for the more radical sects found in west and south Asia. Approaching Ivan made sense, for they received international recognition, autonomous local structures, and a shield against their more fanatical religious brethren.

Significantly, with the destruction of the old khanates, the entire Volga was in Russian hands, which opened up the east to Russian trade. However, the two routes for international trade, the eastern through the Volga, or the (north) western through the Baltic, were a source of disagreement between Ivan and his boyar duma. The Shuskii’s and others believed that Ivan’s turn to the east was a mistake, and like much of the oligarchy, sought to become more Polish in their economic and political orientation. It came to Ivan’s attention that some of these oligarchs were approaching Ivan’s relatives to seek a rival claimant to the throne. And following a dubious but old tradition, were negotiating with Germans and Poles: Russia would be theirs in exchange for favorable terms of trade.

In 1553, Ivan fell ill. So ill, in fact, that many thought he would die. Parties were thrown in every formerly important appanage capital, as the boyars were convinced that their time had come. Ivan was worried not merely about his health, but also the nature of Russian rule if he were to die. Ivan demanded that the boyar clans swear allegiance to Ivan’s son Dimitri, which they naturally refused, and the boyars, even before Ivan’s death, had agreed to place Vladimir of Staritsa on the throne. Vladimir, for his part, had promised a return to the old appanage system and a purge of the church to eliminate any pro-Moscow elements. The church however, engaged in an intense round of prayer and fasting for Ivan’s recovery, which, as if through a miracle, occurred shortly after, when all the palace doctors were convinced Ivan could not survive. After his recovery, Ivan realized his former approach to the boyar problem was insufficient. The agreement to place Vladimir on the throne proved to Ivan the lack of loyalty to Russia of that class, ad their desire to reduce Russia to a set of tiny principalities while chasing filthy lucre. When the clans though Ivan was as good as dead, they showed their true colors. Therefore, Ivan’s approach would soon be different, and will take the form of the Oprichnina.

By the 1560s, it was clear that Ivan, though popular among the peasants, was hated by the elite. The control of the boyars meant better treatment of the peasants (in that there was a check on boyar power) as well as greater enforced responsibilities for the upper reaches of the secular Russian elite. Scheming against Ivan was now a regular activity of the elite clans in Russia, and, before Ivan could be assassinated, the higher boyar clan leaders were banished throughout Russia. Those involved with foreign intrigue were not executed (as they would have been elsewhere), but banished and sent to monasteries for the performance of penance.

Russia was now a wealthy country, feared by both east and west, and the boyar elite now could not resist scheming to gain a greater piece of that pie, though everyone knew that they would have to get around Ivan to do so. The greatest role of Christian monarchy is the control over the nobility, whether merchant or agricultural. Monarchy has always been the voice of moderation when the oligarchy wishes to increase its power at the expense of the lower orders. Though Ivan succeeded in thwarting their plans, the Russian nobility never quite reconciled itself to working “under” a tsar.

Though some of the boyars were removed from the duma and sent to the utter reaches of the empire, they were now out from the sight of Ivan, and, even more problematic, had left an army of clients behind. Boyar clans, it should be noted, themselves had security services and a retinue/bureaucracy that maintained their interest even when the noble patriarch was no longer on the scene.

By 1564, Ivan, after 31 years in office, decided to abdicate. There can be little doubt that Ivan was truly exhausted, his life was a constant battle with the elite, with foreign powers and military campaigns. Realizing that he was getting nowhere in dealing with the oligarchy, Ivan wanted to retire and live a life as a monastic. But, as the saying goes, truth is stranger than fiction. Once Ivan moved out of the palace, the boyars realized something: they were considered a rapacious group by the common population. Riots broke out throughout Russia against the boyar elite, and several of them lost their lives. Popular democracy demanded that Ivan return and slaughter the boyar lords, and, if Ivan would not from above, they would from below. The Russian people clearly made their voices heard: Russia is a monarchy, not a “democracy.” Democracy means the institutionalization of greed and arrogance, and only Christian monarchy can restore moderation and order. In a bizarre twist, the boyar clans demanded Ivan return.

Ivan, still recuperating, hesitated. Having absolutely no desire to continue ruling, he felt out the mood of the oligarchy. Soon, the patriarchs of the clans sought him out personally, and begged him on their knees to return to the kremlin (some dishonest writers claim that “the church” approached Ivan, rather than the boyars). Ivan agreed, but demanded a far more submissive oligarchy, a demand that would take the form fo the Oprichnina once Ivan returned. The Oprichnina was an institution designed to control the boyars. Its primary location was in the former appanage of Vladimir Startisa. This personal principality of Ivan was exempt from all taxation and was organized on strict moral lines. Like the intendants under Louis XIII, the Oprichniks were lower level boyars, mobilized against the upper levels who had always looked down upon them. The Oprichniks were a semi-military force, dressed in black, who carried brooms on their horses as a symbol to “sweep away corruption.” Extremely popular with the peasantry, it was the symbol of the power of Christian monarchy against semi-pagan aristocracy.

Yet, of course, in the historical literature on the period, the Oprichnina is treated with intense contempt. From the 19th century on, English speaking academics have always had a love affair with oligarchy. From condemnations of Ivan III to the romanticization of Boris Berezovskii, the academic elite have always felt a certain community of interest with oligarchy. When Putin sought to eliminate many of the modern day oligarchs, the establishment in America, from the Socialist Workers Party to the Heritage Foundation, howled with anger. One might be cynical and claim that all academic funding derives from the American oligarchy though their foundations, hence their studied positions on these issues, but that may be too simple.

More curious is the constant Anglo-American double standards. When Louis XIII created his intendants, this is often viewed as a “progressive” approach to state building. The intendants acted no different from the Oprichniks. The same was done in Prussia under Frederick William. Far more vicious was the “cleansing” of the American south after the Civil War, Germany after World War II or the “modernization” of Russia under Peter. Peter murdered more Russians during the creation of Petersburg alone that Ivan executed in his 60 year reign. Yet Peter is a progressive force, Ivan evil incarnate. Oliver Cromwell murdered more Irish in 10 minutes than Ivan executed Russians in 60 years, yet American schoolchildren are taught that Cromwell was the “grandfather of democracy.” George Soros engineered the Asian currency meltdown in 1996-7, destroying the livelihoods of millions, yet he is the primary bankroller of Hilary Clinton’s presidential campaign, and has created the careers of hundreds of academics and journalists worldwide.

Ultimately, according to monastic records, about 5500 Russian elites were executed by Ivan over 60 years, and this only after attempting to conciliate them at the beginning of his reign. During Ivan’s war with Livonia and Poland, the elite of Russia negotiated with the Crimean Tartars to invade Russia from the south, in hopes to humiliate Russia and Ivan personally, and it was activity like this that permitted Ivan to take the drastic actions he did, but these actions pale in comparison to western state building methods.

Ivan’s foreign policy was directed in two directions, to the southeast and to the northwest. The strength and wealth of Muscovy threatened the Poles and Lithuanians, and, with the active cooperation of the boyar class, made war on Muscovy continually throughout Ivan’s reign. In 1572, Ivan was forced to smash the Livonian order of knights once and for all, partially to open up trading with Dutch and German merchants who used these orders to shut Muscovy out. Partially, the elimination of the orders was meant to counter the Union of Lublin in 1569, that sought a Roman Catholic superstate on Russia’s borders.

Ultimately, with his Transylvanian allies, Ivan was able to fight the new union to a draw. The superstate also mobilized the Swedes to distract Ivan’s attention to the north, and thus, Muscovy, with a disloyal elite, were fighting three major European powers at once. This sort of reality is nothing uncommon in Russian history, but is likely the most important cause of serfdom and the centralization of the monarchy. For Ivan, this military crisis was the primary reason he looked to solve the boyar problem once and for all. To see Ivan’s crushing of boyar power as a symptom of “paranoia” is anti-historical and insipid. Ivan faced a crisis of both domestic and foreign policy not of his own making. Only through the steadfastness and level-headedness of Ivan was Muscovy saved.

In 1558, the Stroganov family, the wealthiest in Russia, sought to increase their holdings and fortune by colonizing the largely empty region of Siberia. Siberia is a huge country in itself, with breathtaking mountains and greenery, one of the most beautiful. Contrary to the public prejudice that Siberia is merely a frozen waste, Siberia became vital to Moscow’s continued survival while ringed with enemies and penetrated with spies. Siberia opens up to Russia a massive store of furs, timber, flax and numerous other resources at the time in high demand in the west. The opening of Siberia through the efforts of the Cossack hosts under Irmak continued Moscovy’s march to greatness.

Ivan’s accomplishments are far to great to mention in this short lecture. As one of the greatest monarchs of European history, he is, naturally enough, little understood by the Anglo-American academic establishment that, by and large, is a rather mediocre lot. By the time of Ivan’s death, Muscovy was exhausted through constant border patrols, internal upheavals and foreign wars. Russia was mobilized to fight wars on numerous fronts, notwithstanding the simmering boyar hatred for Ivan’s successes.

To summarize Ivan is difficult. His interest, primarily, was to create a rational system of rule that would more efficiently administer Europe’s most powerful empire. He sought to control the main boyar pastime, the constant fighting over rank and preference, which, itself, shows the incapacity of the boyar elite to rule. These battles over supremacy among boyar clans caused Ivan and the Muscovite state no end of trouble and was as much a part of Moscow’s exhaustion as any of Ivan’s policies. Only Alexis and his son Peter will finally, and only incompletely, deal with the ranking system of servitors and aristocrats.

Ivan also sought to end the collecting of properties by church bodies. The church, especially her monasteries, were regularly given gifts by the boyar class to intercede for their souls and for their loved ones, donations were universally considered in Christendom the expiation of many sins for both the living and dead. While Ivan was sympathetic to the monastic life, he realized the political problems these landholdings caused. Much land was being taken by monastic bodies and treated as the private property of the boyar class. Ivan’s motivation was not to harm the church, but rather to stop a form of boyar expansionism under the guise of (often legitimate) piety. While he did not nationalize church property, he limited the amount of land they could receive in the form of gifts. Furthermore, in the building of a service nobility independent of the boyarin (as his father and grandfather attempted to do as well), he needed fallow land with which he able to reward his supporters. Unfortunately, the monasteries became political footballs between the boyarin and the monarchy.

Ivan also created the corps of musketeers, or “shooters,” the streltsy. These were an elite corps of soldiers who were under the direct control of the monarchy and a part of its bodyguard. Ivan began to build a standing army to counteract the private armies of the boyar classes. Military service in medieval Muscovy (and elsewhere) was the call up of the private forces of the nobility to serve in wartime under the general guidance of the tsar. Ivan, realizing the problems this caused, began the creation of a standing army. The Oprichniks might also be considered an aspect of this drive, one shared by most of Europe at Ivan’s time.

Ivan, like his successors, sought to use the knowledge developing in western Europe for his own benefit. Again, contrary to academic prejudice, Ivan sent for foreigners from France and England, two allies of Ivan during much of his reign, to counteract the embargo the Livonians and their allies had placed upon the expanding realm. Ivan created bureaucratic posts for foreigners to experiment with different forms of government, rule and bureaucracy. He was interested in foreign views of religion, political thought and military apparatus. Ivan’s mind was always open, always experimenting, always active, and it is his policies that paved the way for Peter the Great at a very different time.

In the financial realm, Ivan too, was an innovator. The income of the Russian state derived from trading dues collected from the towns. In Russia, cities were largely either trading centers of military posts, or both. These towns, like elsewhere in Europe, were given certain trading privileges in return for dues paid directly to the state. Unfortunately, to Ivan’s irritation, the townsmen were notorious liars, and would regularly hide their income from the state. For Ivan’s part, this was a problem when their privileges in the trading realm were based on the military protection Ivan afforded them against the knights, Poles, Lithuanians, Germans and others. A headman governed the town, and he was either appointed (as in Novgorod) or elected by the guilds. The guilds themselves were organized by trade and income, and regulated the means and forms that trading would take. It was the guilds that paid the taxes, and like the rural commune, the burden was assessed by democratic vote.

There was a standard impost on the trade of corn. There was a tax levied on households, and itself was assessed by the peasant commune and the burden was democratically spread out over the estate on a “ability to pay” basis. The commune voted on the burdens of labor and taxation, the taxes were paid to the landlord (often absentee) and the landlord paid it to the state. In other words, without a prosperous peasantry, the landlord would be in hock to the state, which, given the realities of Russian life under Ivan, could be very unpleasant for the landlord. The pubic baths were also a state monopoly and yielded a strong stream of revenue.

Crown taverns were another form of revenue, as were the standard customs and fines. These provided a decent stream of revenue for the crown (about 1.3 million rubles a year), but the state itself needed to be rationalized for the proper handling of these revenues. The creation of a large bureaucracy (though small by European standards) and new offices were a major priority for Ivan. Even here, Ivan created the precedent that was later to be followed by Peter.

The judicial system under Ivan was rational and fair. Usually, peasants were judged by communal courts under the headship of the staroshina, or headman (literally, “elder”), elected by the communal assembly. The church too, under the decrees of the 100 Chapters Synod, were judged solely by ecclesiastical courts. Other courts, however, existed, such as the volost court, which had a local jurisdiction, and the tribune of the voivod, which was a court system under the upper boyar classes, and a supreme court in Moscow indirectly under Ivan’s jurisdiction. All law was public, and, at the local level, customary and therefore, known to all.

Why is the System so hostile to Ivan?

The System is oligarchical at its root. One must remember that academics do what they’re told. They receive money from the major foundations, themselves outposts of oligarchical (and tax-exempt) capital, and these foundations reward those they consider “reliable” writers and reject those who are unreliable. No academic research can be performed without grants from the major foundations. Therefore, academics conform themselves to their agenda, and, hence, the proverbial liberalism of the academic establishment. They conform themselves to the corporate culture of academia the same way one conforms oneself to the culture of any job in order to succeed. Academics are no different in this respect. Of course, this makes a mockery of the liberalism and independence they would like you to believe they uphold.

From a political point of view, modern presidents are weak, “frontman” figures, given media attention due to their malleability. Without media attention, no political, particularly at the state or national level, can ever hope to get anywhere. Ideology really does not matter, for the System has left and right wings, but the ability to take orders, so to speak, is central. Therefore, strong rulers, those who take actions against oligarchs, are harshly treated in the literature.

The main System complaint against Ivan was that he used violence against the boyars. Is this justified?

The System has no right making such a complaint at all, as modern democracies are based on threats, and founded on civil war. Boyars under Ivan had private armies, bodyguards, pet bishops and substantial lands. The boyar clans under Ivan, taken together had far more power and money than the state. Ivan used the only methods at his disposal to end boyar fractiousness. They had turned traitor against Russia not once, but dozens of times, seeking alliances with Muslims, Poles, Germans, Dutch, you name it, in order to destroy Ivan and bring Russia into the European trading order. History changes very little. The same forces are at work in Russia now. The names change, but the Regime does not.