One of the issues that Razin made central was that of the Old Belief. Under Tsar Alexis, the patriarch Nikon (1605-1681) had implemented certain reforms of the Church that irritated rural traditionalists. Many seem minor, such as the number of particles cut during the proskomede, the number of Alleluias, the direction of processions, etc., but some were more major: the open imitation of the Greeks (using books printed in Italian), the mixing of the genders during services, introducing a “top-down” sort of administration, alteration in church music, etc. The life and struggle of the Old Belief is one of the most interesting aspects of Old Russia, and one that I have studied most intently.

For the historian, of course, modern Old Believers are a living icon of 17th century Russia. You would think that they would be studied in more detail, in that they have as their basis the maintenance of Old Russian customs, but, alas, Russian studies being what it is. . . .

One might say, by way of preliminaries, that the introduction of the reforms under Alexis/Nikon were hasty and reckless. The average “Russia scholar” believes these reforms to concern the method of signing oneself, but, of course, the issues are far deeper. Alexis truly believed that, in introducing what he thought were Greek reforms, he was continuing the integration of Holy Russia into a position of leadership in all Orthodoxy, Greek, Slav, Arab. Therefore, from the purely formal point of view, he was continuing a long tradition of Russian monarchs in reforming law and order with the purpose of keeping up with the demands of empire. The church reform and the revocation of the Stoglav Synod were part of this movement.

However, the life of the Orthodox church and its particular Russian characteristics were synonymous with Russian culture. Therefore, such reforms, as minor as they seem on paper, were totalitarian in their intent, for it referred to all culture, the way the medieval Russian mind understood it. What was most galling, however, was this was done in an imperious way, by force, rather by a long and organic method of development that Orthodoxy had always enjoyed and experienced over the centuries.

I do, however, follow the school of thought that goes beyond theology and into social life, for at least, that both were considered identical in the popular mind. Modern Americans neatly separate their “regular” life from their “church” life, leading to the beginnings of multiple personality disorder. This disorder, in a clinical sense, is based on purely modern conditions, where roles are separated from one another, such as “businessman,” “Christian,” “father,” etc., each of which, in practice, does not take from the others. The medieval mind would immediately and intuitively think of this as a mental illness in itself, but it doubtlessly leads to more serious chemical/clinical disorders once institutionalized. The medieval mind, Russian or Latin, was based around organic integration of roles, and the catalyst of this integration was the Orthodox church. Therefore, alteration, especially if done for political reasons, will lead to a major backlash.

The leader of the Old Belief, until his execution, was the archpriest Avvakum. A strong, pious traditionalist, Avvakum is often termed a mere fanatic, but, given his writing style and personal popularity, this is far from the truth. Contrary to popular myth, this priest was quite willing to make certain reforms to the liturgy in order to make it more understandable. Old Believers do not believe in merely fossilizing 17th century Russia, nor do they worship the “letter” of the liturgy. They are not “ignorant,” as Paul Meyendorff claims, of liturgical development, either. The Old Belief did believe, however, that Nikon/Alexis had gone too far, were too willing to use force, and began to change things that had nothing to so with making the liturgy more accessible, but making it more foreign and politically acceptable to the Greeks.

The social content of the reforms might be reduced to the question of ecumenical empire. Now that the Greeks were prisoners of the Turks, and the only significant independent Orthodox church was in Russia, Alexis was forced to realize that his mission was to the world. Certainly, this is not the first time such an idea crossed the Russian mind, but in Alexis’ time, it was crystal clear. If Orthodoxy was to irradiate the world, it was up to the Russians, in a secular sense, to make this possible. Therefore, an inter-ethnic consciousness developed, one where, under Russian leadership, the Orthodox of the world must unite, at least in spirit and prayer, and create a single, unified body. Hence, the desire to rewrite the Russian service books under “Greek” models. It is true that the Athonites had burned Russian books on the Holy Mountain in protest over the “errors” found therein, and that many Greeks were dissatisfied with the Russian translations. Add to this the Graecophilia of Nikon personally, it seemed to the common population that Russian tradition was being abandoned in favor of the enslaved Greek, and for political purposes.

At its height, the Old Believer rebellion reached over 10 million people. Today, it stays steady at about 250,000 (according to official Russian statistics). But in order to have attracted so many millions from Alexis’ time onward, it stands to reason there was more at stake than the methods of signing oneself. I believe that what we have uncovered so far in these lectures is suggestive as to the motive that would lead church reforms to become a major war of liberation.

In building an empire, a few things are necessary. First, regular and efficient methods of taxation. Russia after the Troubles was forced to make collection more and more brutal, though this does not exactly make Russia unique, given the time period. Second, regular standing armies, which, in the Russian case, meant an influx of foreigners (especially Scots and Germans), to teach Russians the latest methods of European warfare. Third, an increasingly large bureaucracy. Fourth, as a result of that, a landlord class was forced to squeeze more and more out of the peasants on their estates. Fifth, an international outlook, for empires, by definition, are multi-ethnic. These are just a few necessary ingredients, whether they are sufficient or not is another story, but, in contemplating these, one might b able to see the outlines of a future rebellion and lessons for the modern age.

The Old Believers, yesterday and today, are highly ethnic in composition. In other words, they use only Old Slavonic, and dress in old-style Russian clothing. It is an ethnic rebellion, to that extent, against the increasing internationalism of the later parts of Alexis’ reign. Little that does not derive from Russian culture from the time of Alexis or before is considered suspect. It is no surprise that during the Razin rising, protests against foreigners commanding military units in Russia were loudly condemned.

The Old Believers very easily equated the reforms of the church to the increasing burden of taxation on the peasantry, for all was connected. If empire demanded an ecumenical outlook, and empire demanded large military establishments and bureaucracies that cost money, then the church reforms are connected to high taxes. Therefore, it is also no surprise to see both Razin, and his Old Believer followers demanding a pure Russian (sacradotal) monarchy and self-governed communes without landlords. As Ivan IV was associated with the Stoglav Council he called, the Old Belief began to revere the memory of this great and long-lived Tsar, and denied that the patriarch had the right to merely revoke a solemn council, for many Old Believer practices were officially sanctioned at that synod.

Therefore, one might summarize the Old Belief this way: the church reforms were viewed as a political means to create a global, Orthodox empire. In other words, the reforms were a means to attain Greek acceptance, and thus, in some way, to build an international Orthodox coalition under Russian leadership. The reforms themselves were done in a hasty manner, using Greek books only recently printed by Catholic presses in Italy. Of course, the building of this empire was, as always, expensive, requiring large armies and even larger state structures, with the rewards, again, going solely to a small, and increasingly non-Russian elite. Needless to say, it was the rural life, the life of the formerly independent commune, that suffered the most, for it was the peasantry who needed to support the life of the landlord/bureaucrat. The Old Believer rebellion, then, was one of the peasantry and lower level noble against the increasingly cosmopolitan ruling class in Moscow. The fact that the reforms were imposed by force did not help matters.

Alexis erred here. For all the manifest holiness and piety of this great tsar, Alexis, by forcing through the acceptance of the reforms, destroyed a great degree of moral capital the young Romanov line had painstakingly collected since the deposition of Shuiskii. Regardless of what one might think of Nikon, the reality is that the Orthodox Church and the Russian state lost tens of millions of its most serious followers. The monarchy lost its most faithful supporters, which, from the historical point of view, is telling. For now, the modern liberal historian needs to wrestle with the fact that tens of millions of Russians were willing to die for the ideals of sacerdotal monarchy, Orthodox tradition and the rural life. And it is for this reason that I draw a direct line from Nikon to Bolshevism, not because I think Nikon was anything other than a pious Orthodox man, but because the Russian state had, from now on, to function without the support, if not active opposition, of millions of its most reliable supporters. Support now needed to be built elsewhere, and, after Peter I had left the scene, support needed to be found in the state bureaucracy and army. It was not until Nicholas I where some sort of synthesis was attempted. The modernization of Peter could have never existed without Alexis and the defection of the Old Believers. And with this, we end this part of the course, and begin modern Russia, a Russia now split between two irreconcilable parties.

How was it that the Old Belief went from disagreeing with certain reforms to believing that the Nikonian Church was bereft of grace?

Passions ran high once the state began to persecute this group. The Old Believer crisis was so badly mishandled that the final conclusion of the Old Believer movement, that the Russian church was without grace, was inevitable. Basically, by the reign of Catherine, the Old Believers saw the Petrine churches in Petersburg, that looked like Roman palaces, as non-Russian and pagan in origin. They saw western style paintings in official churches, western style singing, and the free mixing of the genders as a complete lack of discipline and love for tradition. Genders were strictly segregated in Old Believer Churches, and in all churches up until the modern era. Some Old Believers began to claim that some Nikonian churches were baptizing according to Roman customs, and some were waiting until the teenage years to chrisimate children. I know that the latter is true, but I’m not sure about the former. Furthermore, since many of the reformers were from Ukraine, many Old Believers thought that these reformers were basically non-Russians placing Polish/Latin inspired customs upon Orthodox Russia.

Remember, the Nikonian church tried to ban things they later restored. They attempted to ban the three bar cross, only later to restore it. They banned the ancient western liturgies (as the Old Believers always performed at the feast of St. Gregory the Great), only later to permit it. At least in the cities, the official church used architecture from the Roman empire (particularly under Peter I), but later went back to the older style. I think that maybe, some of these reversions were done under Old Believer pressure.

You seem to be highly sympathetic to the Old Belief.

Yes. I believe that the Old Believers, so long as they have a priesthood with a valid line of consecration, are fully Orthodox, and are people who we can learn from. Politically, the Old Belief was right in understanding the nature of the reforms and its connection to empire building. They stand for sacerdotal monarchy, free communes and the rural life, and so do I. They maintained what was best about old Russia. However, do not construe my sympathy for the Old Belief with any form of rejection of the great monarchs of the 19th century. Nicholas I, Alexander III and St. Nicholas II were holy and strong men, from my point of view, but they were hampered by the Petrine structure they inherited.