Lecture V: Novgorod and Pskov

In any discussion of the mighty Novgorod, one needs to preface the actual history with some sort of digression about Russia’s future, and a “crossroads” that Russia reaches once Novgorod’s civilization is made materially manifest. In other words, Russia faces a hard choice–either the “absolutism” of St. Andrew and the “Suzdal idea” or the class-based oligarchy of Novgorod, the original “window” into northern European capitalism–such as it was.

Novgorod, in terms of the city’s layout, is symbolic of this schism in Russian life–her religious life was found on the right bank, typified by the cathedral of the Wisdom of God, and her commercial life on the left. “Right” in the old Roman and medieval idea was the side of honesty and honor. It was the sword hand for a warrior, and thus the hand that fought openly, according to fixed rules. In religion, the “right” was the side of salvation, the presence of God that soothes and saves. The “left,” on the other hand, was the “dagger” hand, that side of deceit, of fraud, of fighting “dirty.” In Christian thought the “left” was the side of damnation, or the presence of God that scorches. The notion of duality will become more and more important as Russia develops, and the division between Novgorod and Suzdal (and later Moscow) is the first obvious example of the westernizer/Slavophile debate, much misunderstood by western historians.

Novgorod dominated the life of northern Russia, and her heartland was in the extreme northwest corner of the country. Agriculture is nearly impossible in the bogs and frozen wastes of the north, and therefore, the life of the population developed into one of trade. Many supporters of this “Novgorodian” idea will make the comment that Novgorod is the most faithful example of ancient Russia, having a powerfully diversified economy based on water-based and land-based trade. While not disputing the truth of this claim (made by a handful of Ukrainian nationalists today, using Novgorod to act as the dialectical opposite of Vladimir-Moscow), it needs to be said by way of preface that the schism that Novgorod typifies in Russian life is made no less obvious by way of her own internal schism, one based on class, and this schism is not typical of Kievian Rus. Regardless of the rather skillful polemical use of Great Novgorod in modern times, the schism that Novgorod represents for Russia as a whole exited in miniature in Novgorod as a city and as an empire in itself. In Biblical terms, Novgorod has its image in the ancient city of Tyre, condemned by the prophets. On must keep in mind that Novgorod at its height, was not merely the wealthiest city in Russia, but one of the wealthiest cities in the world.

Novgorod’s political life is significant: it is based around the more or less constant mobilization of her wealthy classes against monarchy, or against any sort of overlordship that was not based on contract, a contract not unlike any that existed in commercial life. The maintenance of her privileges of wealth is the idea behind her institutions and elite political attitudes.

Novgorod was a republic not in the vulgar sense that she did not have a monarch, but in the proper and full sense of being based on the wealth of her leading citizens, and a political ideology based on the maintenance of that position. Novgorod was extremely sucessful, either by chance or deliberate design, that she took little part in the civil wars that convulsed the rest of Russia, civil wars that took place in the absence of functioning political institutions. Institutionalization was the specific genius of Novgorod save her economic prowess, and it is this institutionalization (both mentally and physically) that protected her from overlordship, in her own specific sense of the term. In other words, the functioning of real, living institutions separated Novgorod from the rest of Russia, held together (save on the local level) solely by the personality of the princes. No prince, elected by the elite of the city, could ever be powerful enough to serious erode the privileges of the oligarchy. However, these privileges, and the single minded protection of them, will lead to the Great City’s downfall.

Therefore, it is rather clear that there are two specific ways to deal with Novgorod: the standard “academic” way is to claim that democracy and oligarchy are basically synonymous, and therefore treat Novgorod as a “republic” in the broadest sense of the term, one dedicated to “freedom” and “representation.” The other way is to view the city as an oligarchy, dedicated solely to the persistence of the material principle. One’s view on this matter is largely a portal into further ideological views on the remainder of Russian development.

St. Sophia’s Cathedral, Novgorod

Princes were chosen by the oligarchy, the latter itself often divided into specific parties, based on economic self-interest, and whose relative weight normally develops into an offer of service, and, for the sake of royalism, a very difficult service.

While Novgorodian institutionalization was powerful and advanced (in terms of stability and solidity), this did not prevent severe divisions among even the wealthy. Once a prince, one who overstepped his rather confining bounds, was deposed, the party who supported him was purged from the ruling classes of the city.

Specifically, the two major “parties” that developed in the Russian late middle ages (corresponding to the foundation of the Hanseatic League in the north of Europe), largely based on economic geography. The first party was slightly more at ease with “northern” monarchy than the other, and this was largely due to the fact that their trading interests were Volgian, and therefore, an alliance with the northern monarchies, typified by Suzdal, was necessary. This is not to say that they were converts to the ideology of St. Andrew, but rather, were far more willing to make deals with the “northerners” for the sake of free access to that river. The other party was far more European, and, in fact, held the upper hand far more than their rivals, and these were based on Dniper trade, the pan-Russian river, which necessitated a conciliatory policy with the princes of Kiev and others in the region.

In fact, it was Mystislav the Brave who assisted the Dniper faction in their dealings with the Andrewites of the north, and it is here that his historical significance can be found. Therefore, it is clear that their military interests were different as well. After Mystislav, they attempted to hire members of his family to continue their military policy, and yet could not get anyone to come to terms.

Royalism in Novgorod depended on short terms. It is true that the oligarchy did not trust themselves politically to rule nakedly, without the trappings of Russian monarchy. Therefore, it was always necessary to have this institution, though as toothless as practically possible. Here one finds another contradiction in Novgorod’s policy that will eventually lead to its downfall. Politically, Novgorod’s polity was based on the idea of “shadowing,” a term suggesting that native institutions always needed to control and check imported ones (certainly not unknown to other oligarchies like Florence). For example, the assembly shadowed the prince; the citizens shadowed the local party in alliance with the prince, and the militia of the city is always shadowing the retinue of the imported prince. Check and balance are means of maintaining the privileges of the oligarchy.

The nature of the contract between the imported prince and the oligarchy was a multi-faceted, but largely predictable set of understandings. They revolved around, first, the idea of limited power. That decisions made by the imported executive power must always be ratified by oligarchic, emphasized as legislative, power. Second, the tribute paid by the citizens to the prince were to be strictly regulated by contract. Third, that this tribute was to be made up of certain fines and other minor law enforcement matters. Fourth, that all princely bureaucrats were to have a local equivalent, the shadows who were to check and control that of the prince, to act as an accountant and comptroller. Fifth, that no court case can leave the borders of Lord Novgorod, a significant notion in that it forbade the prince to call on help from “foreign” powers in the event of a clash with the oligarchy. Sixth, no prince can own property within the limits of the empire, leading to the disinterested rule of the city, without regard to proprietary interests, an interesting mirror into the soul of the oligarchy. This is the exoskeleton of Novgorodian contracts with imported princes. When all is said and done, the nature of the “foreign” prince is to control the excesses of legislative absolutism and the personal extremism and violence of the oligarchy itself.

Apart from the prince, a hireling of the assembly, the executive branch of government existed to shadow that of the prince, and one that was completely “native” to the city. First, the well known position of Posadnik, an executive chosen from the among the wealthiest families of the city. His role was, first, to keep a watchful eye on the prince. Second, to assess and distribute the tax burden, always a problem in republican systems; the class nature of this position is extremely clear here. And third, to head diplomatic missions to other members of the trading league of northern Europe, a position of extreme importance.

The second aspect of the local executive is that of the Tysatki, or the head of the town militia. His primary position is to control the retinue of the prince. He also possessed a handful of minor juridical functions as well. At the local level, the city was divided into fifths, and each fifth elected a mayor for specific local issues. A para-political institution was that of the Orthodox church. The Orthodoxy of Novgorod is an anomaly in Russian politics, in that republican systems are normally materialist and occult in their theosophistical teachings. However, in this matter, it bears mention that the bishop normally took the side of the general population against the oligarchy time and again. On the other hand, it is also clear that the archbishop of Novgorod was an independent ruler, without confirmation from Kiev, or anywhere else. He was also another check on the prince, and was tolerated for that reason. The archbishop could be deposed by a vote of the assembly, and therefore, the classic structure of checks and balances were built into the very structure of the church and state.

Novgorod is the darling of academic historians. Treated as a “democracy,” Novgorod is contrasted to the “tyranny” of Suzdal and its later prodigy, Moscow. It was nothing of the kind, and its obsession with material wealth led to her destruction and fall. As always, wealth does not bring happiness, it beings distorted personalities, endless conflict and a fixation with losing what one has. It’s internal divisions were soon to lead to its downfall, which will be treated later.

Questions from Students

Could Novgorod have ever evolved into a real democracy?

If by “real democracy” you mean a modern parliament, then she already had one. If by “real democracy” you mean representative institutions, then no. Modern republics are oligarchies. They serve those with money and power, for only such people can run a proper campaign, buy media time and get noticed by other elites. All modern campaigns for office are mediated by media elites, so at the very least, it is an oligarchy of information. Real representation can only be done at the local level, where all classes and occupational groups are represented on local councils. This was the tradition of most of Russia up until the revolution, where the Bolsheviks controlled all things from the center. In modern “democracies,” unlike medieval life, every aspect of social life comes under state supervision (whether in Soviet Marxism or Western Capitalism), mediated by a corporate media and elite foundations. What has occurred is that the Novgorod-like oligarchy has been forced to open the franchise to more and more people on a national scale, but has merely organized its forms of manipulation in a more secretive matter. When at one time money bought votes, now, it is media manipulation and the creation of images. PR firms control the flows of information, at least from mainstream sources, and academics are dependent on elite foundation cash to fund research. Oligarchy has merely had to change form, rather than change its content. True representation was guarded by the monarchy. Parliamentarians were its opponents. These are two very different things.

back