The robber synod of 1666 in Moscow was a farce: roughly half the bishops at this synod were Greeks, all subjects and agents of the Turkish empire, most of whom bought their sees at a high price from the Sultan and local Greek elites, and then taxed their subjects heavily to repay back their elite patrons. Under no circumstances can there be “bishops” in such a case, and, especially in Serbia, many families who remained behind from the migration to Hungary lived a “priestless” existence, worshiping as best they could without clergy, with the head of the zadruga as the head of the local church, and the central yearly service was the slava. But this writer submits that these extended families had a healthier Orthodox life than the endlessly corrupt Phanar and its wealthy “old men” who controlled the policies of the Greek millet. Nevertheless, the bishops who came to Moscow not only were simoniacs, pro-Turkish, but were also highly involved with international trade, specifically using their position and pull with the Turkish state to engage in lucrative trade with Russia and Ukraine via the important Black Sea ports. Hence, the bishops who arrived in Moscow ready to condemn both Nikon and the Old Rite were highly compromised figures, all of whom had both political and mercenary axes to grind. There are two recent publications that have received little attention, but shed light on the economic factors behind the sorry 1666 synod and its Petrine aftermath. These are both located in the excellent (2001) collection Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays edited by I.S. Koropeckyj and Published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. The two pieces are called “Trade and Muscovite Policy Towards Ukraine” (172-185) by Carol Stevens, and “Petrine Mercantilist Policies Towards Ukraine” (186-209) by Bohdan Krawchenko. Taken together, these two pieces bring many new insights onto the economic issues bought to bear both by the Nikonian schism and its political counterpart in the Petrine revolution. They speak volumes concerning the vapid economic rationale behind both the adoption of the New Russian Rite as well as Petrine colonial policies towards the extreme southern parts of Russia and the Hetmanate in Ukraine. The destruction of these area economially was part of a predatory Petrine plan (which me made quote clear was his intention), explains the revolt of Mazeppa, the importance of the Old Rite merchant communities and the eventual risings of Bolotnikov and later, Pugachev.

It should be mentioned right here that these economic relationships are not completely adequate to explain the various policies of the southerners (south Russians and Ukrainians), or of the Petrine state, or for that matter, the adoption of the New Rite, which filtered in through Ukraine from the areas controlled by the Phanar and its church organization in the Balkans. The economy is but one variable, albeit an important one. However, it should be stated that the influence of the forces for the New Rite mirror exactly the flow of trade from the Crimea and the Black Sea through Ukraine and into Muscovy, and this cannot be ignored.

The first point that needs to be made is that a large and brisk trade existed prior to the robber synod of 1666 between Ukraine and Russia. All major agricultural and textile goods, as well as metals exchanged hands between merchants attached to the Hetmanate and the merchants attached to Moscow. But the more important element is that after 1635, the Russian state, began to fortify its southern border substantially, creating new markets with thousands of new noble servitors and their forces being sent to pacify the southern border with Ukraine and Poland. Though this had the effect of harming trade between the two areas (and possibly alarming the Greeks), it was necessary to the Muscovite mind from a military point of view.

But the two major issues both with the Greeks and the Ukrainians were the question of vodka and tobacco. Both the Greeks though the Black Sea (and not excluding many bishops of the Phanar), were desperate to open Russia up for tobacco imports. The Greeks were dispatched to Moscow to begin to lobby for a Muscovite “openness” to both tobacco (illegal in Moscow) and Ukrainian brewed vodka, which was also a problem since the Muscovite policy was one of strict monopoly over distilling rights. Therefore, given the Black Sea connection and the never ending search for money from the Phanar-based bishops, there is every reason to believe that a joint Greek-Ukrainian movement to open Moscow up for vodka and tobacco was underway just prior to the 1666 synod. However, the movement of Russian military forces to the border soon was to put a stop to this, and hence, other ways needed to be found. It might also be noted that by 1650, the Cossacks under Khilminitskii were in regular negotiations with the Ottomans and Greek merchants, and many Muscovites thought war with both powers was imminent.

The new servitors loyal to Moscow needed their own markets, and they drove the price of Ukrainian grain through the roof. This assisted both the development of noble based production as well as the Ukrainian staple: the yeoman, the small landowner. Precisely one year before the 1666 synod, attended by dozens of Phanar and merchant based Greeks, a trade ban was proclaimed from Tsar Alexii between Moscow and Ukraine. This was partially motivated by the fact that the tremendous production of Ukrainian grain to meet demand was forcing many northern Russians out of business, most of whom were incapable of producing enough for market in that harsh climate, and certainly was not able to match southern growing seasons and the sheer volume of arable land. But even more than this, it was also clear that the Ukrainians maintained a brisk trade not merely with Moscow, but also with Germany, Poland and the Hansa, leading to a prosperous and powerful Orthodox Hetmanate, soon to be openly dedicated to the Old Rite and hence hostile to Moscow.

Despite all this, by the time of Alexis’ death, Ukraine was feeding Moscow, and the Ukrainian vodka distillers were coming out with a product superior to the Muscovite version. Hence, Ukraine seemed to be winning on all fronts: first, she had a strong and prosperous peasantry, largely small holders with a substantial amount of increasingly agrarian Cossack aristocracy. Second, her vodka was challenging the Russian vodka monopoly and worse, her grain was driving Russian grain off the market both in terms of price and quality. The military servitors of Moscow on the Ukrainian border was forcing more and more production of grain, making higher and higher profits for the landed classes in the Hetmanate, noble and non-noble. The policy of the Russian government from 1667 onward was to supply the soldiers at the border with cash to buy Ukrainian grain. Ukrainian merchants, however, were also supplying forces of Poland, Austria, Prussia and Turkey, and hence, the Ukrainian prices were not coming down.

But what is the connection here? First of all, there seems to be an open policy early on to integrate Ukraine with Moscow in a trading bloc where Moscow would get all the benefits and Ukraine do all the work. Under Russian control, the Ukrainian bread basket would be shifted from northern and western trade (where she enjoyed an excellent reputation) and moved strictly northward to Russia. It seems then that there is an economic element to the Russian new liturgical rite in that it sought to conform to Greek/Ukrainian practice and hence, facilitate this integration of the two peoples. Further, as mentioned already, the Greek interest in a strong Black Sea, Ukrainian and Russian/Muscovite trade was also very important, as the Greek bishops, always in debt having to pay the Turks often outrageous sums for their sees, were always looking for ways to make money. Therefore, both Moscow and the Phanar were quite interested in an economic integration of the east Slavic space, especially after the Serbian migration to Austria depopulated the Balkans to a great extent. Ukrainian relations with the Hansa or Austria did not benefit the Phanar, but trade northward would, since it would activate the centrality of Black Sea trade and the Greek merchant interest in grain speculation. Add to this the more obvious demand of the Greek bishops at the 1666 synod for Russian direct financial assistance, and it becomes clear that the Greeks clearly had an economic motivation for creating and justifying the new rite and eliminating all opposition, including the haughty and arrogant Nikon himself, who could not be trusted, After he did his part, he was cast aside as an unruly, “peasant upstart.”

Making matters even more complex was the dominance of the Genoese over Black Sea trade as well. Greek merchants were long allies of the Italians, and millions of Greeks benefitted in Italy by this trade. It was the Greco-Italian alliance that first, printed the books that were to be used by Nikon, but these were the same financial adventurers who manipulated and speculated upon the Black Sea trade, a trade that could only be profitable if Ukraine and Russia were a single integrated unit. This unit would be integrated by local and foreign merchants first, the new rite second, and the Petrine state third. Once the Spanish crown defaulted on its debts, the Italians in Genoa sought to recoup these losses by exploiting Ukrainian and Russian grain competition. Much of the liquidity that eventually came to undergird and finance these ventures came from Genoa, of both Greek and Italian background. While not entirely successful from an Italian point of view, it remains the case that elite opinion in the republic held that Black Sea ventures were the republic’s last attempt to remain dominant after the Spanish debacle(s). But by the time of the sobor, Russia controlled the two river routes to the Black Sea, the Don and the Dnieper.

As far as Peter is concerned, there can be no doubt that his view of Ukraine was one of colonial master to one of colonial servant. Peter did not consider Ukrainians Russians, but a vague “other,” an old ritualist and Cossack holdout that must have its trade privileges taken at any cost. But this was easy after the Mazeppa disaster, and Peter merely tortured his Cossack and Old Rite opponents to death in the south, and installed his own favorites in positions of landed power in right bank Ukraine. The fact that the Hetmanate was wealthy through a strong international trade as well as basically Old Rite in religious sympathies, Peter viewed them as doubly threatening. The Phanar supported Peter’s southern drive so as to link up Jewish and Greek trading interests at the beginning of the 18th century with the large and increasingly cosmopolitan Muscovite markets. When, in 1701, Peter abolished the patriarchate and took over al its prerogatives and incomes, the Greeks immediately endorsed ths outrageous uncanonical move. It might be speculated that Masonic activity among Greek and Jewish merchant groups around Odessa and elsewhere on the Black Sea saw a “brother” member in Peter and hence, sought to support his moves, as well as needing Russian cash, motivated their sycophantic behavior towards Peter. When earlier, Peter began to imprison and torture to death bishops and abbots in his purge of the church, not a peep of protest could be heard from the Phanar.

But Mazeppa was a gift to Peter: in Mazeppa’s ill-advised support of Charles of Sweden, Peter was able to put the brakes on Ukrainian trade, and, given Mazeppa’s “treason,” the kept Senate in Petrograd finally had a legal excuse to take all that cash and finally give the Greeks what they wanted: a Russia on the Black Sea. For his part, Johann Ostermann had advised Peter to flood Ukraine with debased copper coinage to destroy its economic infrastructure and thus re-flood the country with Russian currency. Peter began to place restriction upon restriction on Ukrainian trade, almost in an identical pattern to British restrictions on Irish trade at roughly the same time. All trade needed to go through Russia, no matter the goods’ final destination. Russian merchants approved by Peter flooded into the country, since Ukrainian and many Old Rite merchants were banned from trading in Ukrainian goods. The very fact that millions of Old Believers fled to the south, into Ukraine, at the time made Peter’s policy doubly effective: it tried to break the back of the Old Rite merchant communities (the Old Faith’s life blood, financially speaking) and at the same time, destroy the Ukrainian economy so that henceforth, Ukrainian grain and other products will be at the mercy of Russian demands. Most of the great Ukrainian products became Russian state monopolies, and hence, thousands of Ukrainian and Old Rite merchants were destroyed. Even more, Ukrainian farmers were forced to sell their products only to Moscow at low prices, and occasionally, at not price at all. Lenin’s grain requisitioning, like everything he did, had its beginnings in the Petrine era. At the same time, roughly from 1717-1719, not only were exports abroad prohibited, but there was also a list of goods that could not be imported into Ukraine either, in the hopes of destabilizing the Ukrainian economy to such an extent that it would have no choice but to conform with Russian demands of an economic, ecclesiastical and political nature.

This paper has attempted to argue that the revolution launched by Nikon/Alexis and Peter I was to a great extent, economic in nature. Ukraine and the far south of Russia was a haven for the Old Rite and dissenters of all kinds, including the freedom loving Cossacks whose bravery was matched by their skill in overseas trade. The Greeks and Muscovites conspired, with occasional help from Genoa early on, to integrate the littoral of the Black Sea under Muscovite dominance. This would eliminate any possible defection from Ukraine as well as crush the witness of the Old Rite, powerful and large in Ukraine and far south Russia. Since so many of the merchants were bishops or sponsored by bishops, the ecclesiastical and economic questions were always intertwined. But we should also note that the Nikon/Alexis and Petrine revolutions were all of a single kind, and came from a single source: to capture the trade of southern Russia, and in so doing, have the material base to create a secular, European empire. Of course there were other motivations, but it is this writer’s opinion that one cannot ignore the Black Sea/Greek interest in the nikonian and Petrine revolution, connected for many reasons, but Greek merchant support through Turkish and Italian tutelage is a central one. It should not surprise, since Genoa also cooperated with the mongols for the exact same reason centuries earlier: a united Russia that can become a large Italian and Greek hinterland. Hence, the New Rite, to simplify, was both an economic and ecclesiastical way to increase Greek power over Russia. With the Old Rite firmly in place, the Greeks would remain in their second place position as slaves to the Turks and the “old men” at the Phanar. But the new rite placed Greeks as arbiters of the Russian rite and Russian tradition, now, Greek merchants will take advantage of this ecclesiastical and political centralization to being making profits off Ukrainian trade, safely in Muscovite and new rite hands.